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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the conventional debate among the observers of China-Taiwan relations about whether the dispute between both sides will escalate into a military conflict in the near future, and to explore the impact of Taiwan-China relations on the national security of Taiwan. While most strategic analysts would argue that the Taiwan Strait is still an area where a delicate balance between the conflicting sides is largely determined by military power, this paper assumes that military power is not the only factor that decides Taiwan’s security environment and security policies. Taiwanese leaders’ interpretations of national security are constantly shaped by two forces created by the international political and economic structure where Taiwan has been an active member. The first is the belief that Taiwan’s security can only be ensured by acquiring an international recognition of Taiwan’s independent sovereignty. The second is the law of the market economy. Any nation, including Taiwan, has to adopt appropriate strategies to retain competitiveness in the trend of economic globalization. Interplay of both elements constitutes a fundamental force modulating the security considerations of political elites and the security policy they make. Therefore, the question concerning Taiwanese leaders today is not whether economic transactions across the Taiwan Strait will pose a serious threat to the security of Taiwan, but how the island may keep balance between two apparently contradictory goals: independent sovereignty and economic prosperity.

Keywords: national security, Taiwan-China relations, sovereignty, economic interdependence
While Taiwan has enjoyed a *de facto* independent status since 1949, it is still regarded by the People’s Republic of China as a renegade province, and recovery of the island is considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal in achieving unity of the entire Chinese nation. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that can be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. Now the question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of *de jure* independence that will be intolerable to Beijing.

Only by understanding the domestic and external security environment that shapes and constrains Taiwan’s strategic behavior can one realize why the leaders in Taiwan have tried so hard to resist Beijing’s call for unification and to pursue an independent status in the international community. The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the conventional debate among the observers of China-Taiwan relations about whether the dispute between both sides will escalate into a military conflict in the near future, and to explore the impact of Taiwan-China relations on the national security of Taiwan. In particular, the paper attempts to answer two questions. First, why do most academic scholars, policy makers, and strategic analysts consider Taiwan-China relations as *conflictive* by nature, despite of the fact that growing economic transactions across the Taiwan Strait have led many economists who truly believe in the power of economic interdependence in reducing military conflicts to reach an opposite conclusion? Second, what theories or theoretical approaches have been employed by academic scholars and strategic analysts to study Taiwan’s security and Taiwan-China relations, and what are their limitations?

While most strategic analysts would conclude that the Taiwan Strait is still an area where a delicate balance between the conflicting sides is largely

determined by military power, this paper assumes that military power is not the only factor that decides Taiwan’s security environment and security policies. More specifically, Taiwanese leaders’ interpretations of national security are constantly shaped by two forces created by the international political and economic structure where Taiwan has been an active member. The first is the belief that Taiwan’s security can only be ensured by acquiring an international recognition of Taiwan’s independent sovereignty. The second is the law of the market economy. Any nation, including Taiwan, has to adopt appropriate strategies to retain competitiveness in the trend of economic globalization. Gaining an advantageous position in the world economy is considered by many in Taiwan as the best way to protect Taiwan’s status in the current international political and economic system, and whether the Chinese market may facilitate this goal becomes a key question. In my view, the interplay of both elements constitutes a fundamental force modulating the security considerations of political elites and the security policy they make. Therefore, the question concerning Taiwanese leaders is not just about whether economic transactions across the Taiwan Strait will pose a serious threat to the security of Taiwan, but how the island may keep balance between two apparently contradictory goals: independent sovereignty and economic prosperity.

The first part of the paper will review the development of Taiwan-China relations from 2000 to 2004. Emphasis will be placed on political, economic, and military aspects of the subject, and strategies employed by Taiwanese leaders to alleviate—or to worsen—the political tension between Taiwan and China. Next the paper will briefly review the major theoretical approaches adopted by academic scholars, policy makers, and strategic analysts to explain causes of the Taiwan-China relations, and the solutions they offered. It will be followed by an introduction of a political-economic perspective of Taiwan’s
security. The last part of the paper will further explore the possibilities of designing a political-economic approach to study Taiwan’s security and their implications for security studies and international relations theory.

The author is aware that an analysis of Taiwan’s security should not be limited to its relations with China. Yet given the fact that most people in Taiwan today consider China as the immediate and greatest military threat to the survival of Taiwan, and that discussions of Taiwan-China relations dominate the entire field of Taiwan security studies, the paper will focus only on the relations between Taiwan and China and its impact on Taiwan’s security. Unless Chinese leaders terminate the intimidation strategy against Taiwan, “China threat” will continue to dominate Taiwanese people’s perceptions of security and to influence political leaders’ judgments on security-related issues.

An Overview of Taiwan-China Relations

On March 17, 2000, Chen Shui-bian, the presidential candidate of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the election to become the new president of the Republic of China. DPP’s victory not only signifies the end of KMT’s one-party dominance in Taiwanese politics over the past fifty-five years, but also brings cross-Strait relations into an uncertain future. The first article of the party platform, which was drafted and passed in the first national party congress in 1986, stipulates that establishment of a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan is the ultimate goal of the party. In the next few years, as DPP gradually rose to be a powerful political party on political stage, its leaders began to adopt practical approaches to interpret the spirit of establishing an independent and sovereign Taiwan. One of such attempts was to pass a resolution regarding Taiwan’s future status in the national party congress
of 1999. The Resolution on the Status of Taiwan, often considered by DPP leaders as the their commitment to ending the persisting disputes between those who advocate for Taiwan independence and those for keeping status quo in the society, proclaims that “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. In accordance with international laws, Taiwan's jurisdiction covers Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and its affiliated islands and territorial waters. Taiwan, although named the Republic of China under its current constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.” On Taiwan-China relations, the Resolution asserts that “based on historical and cultural origins, and for the sake of geopolitical regional stability and economic interests, both sides should work together toward a future of co-existence, co-prosperity, mutual trust and mutual benefit.”¹

The 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future made substantial revisions to the 1986 Party Platform and then became the official position of the DPP on cross-Strait relations during the 2000 presidential election. It indeed attracted many moderate voters who once demonstrated strong suspicion to DPP’s pro-independence position.

On his inaugural speech, President Chen announced that if the PRC government has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, the DPP government would never declare formal independence of Taiwan, never change Taiwan’s official name, the “Republic of China,” never revise the constitution to establish a “state-to-state” relationship across the Taiwan Strait, never hold a referendum on Taiwan’s independence, and never abolish the National Reunification Council and the National Unification Guidelines. In addition, Chen also acknowledged that Taiwan and China share the same “ancestral,

¹ DPP website [http://www.dpp.org.tw]
cultural, and historical background” and said the two sides could discuss a future one China. Chen’s pledges are later called by the media as “One If and Five No’s” which became the foundation of DPP government’s policy on cross-Strait relations.

Since then President Chen has made several similar proposals to Beijing, hoping that the semi-official talks between both sides which were interrupted by Beijing in July 1999, could be resumed. For instance, in early 2001, President Chen proposed that both sides of the Taiwan Strait could learn from the European Union’s experience. As he told a group of visiting European Union Parliament members, “The mainland and Taiwan should seek a permanent peace through political integration which, no matter whether it takes the form of a federation, a confederation, a commonwealth or a model like that of the European Union, should be in conformity with the Constitution.” In May 2002, while celebrating the anniversary of his inauguration on the frontline Dadan islet, President Chen formally invited Chinese President Jiang Zemin of China to visit Taiwan. He also added that as the president of the ruling DPP, he was willing to send DPP leaders to visit Beijing to discuss stabilization of cross-Strait relations. None of Chen’s proposals received positive response from Beijing because the latter kept demanding Taiwan to accept the “One China” principle, and because Chen sometimes made opposing comments that simply irritated Beijing leaders.

In May 2003, President Chen’s reaction to the World Health Organization’s

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2 In 1993, both Taiwan and China started a series of informal talks to deal with practical issues across the Strait. The talks had concluded a number of disputes between both sides, such as returning of illegal immigrants and fishery disputes. The talk was interrupted in 1999, when Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui publicly used the term “special state-to-state” relationship to describe the nature of Taiwan-China relations.


rejection of Taiwan was to call upon Taiwanese to voice their support for WHO membership through a referendum. Two months later, when addressing a pro-independence group in Tokyo, Japan, through a video-conference, Chen further announced that “there is one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” and called for support for a referendum to decide whether the island should declare independence from China. Later Chen decided to hold a referendum together with the presidential election of 2004, claiming that China’s missile deployment was threatening Taiwan’s sovereign status, and Taiwan had the legitimate right to hold a referendum in response to such threats.4 His statements immediately drew severe attacks from Beijing and even opposition leaders at home.

Facing a powerful anti-unification voice within the DPP, it is not difficult to imagine why President Chen has been unable to make any formal commitment on ultimate unification with China. He also refused to recognize the existence of the 1992 consensus on One China, which Beijing considered as a premise for resumption of cross-Strait talks. The only thing he could do was to regard the One China principle as a topic for future negotiations and to accept unification as an option for Taiwan.5

On the policies concerning economic transactions across the Taiwan Strait, President Chen has also made contradictory decisions. In January 2001, Taiwan lifted the ban on direct traffic between Taiwan-controlled Kinmen and Matsu islands and China’s Fujian province. The so-called “mini-three-links” allowed the residents of both Taiwan-controlled islands to conduct trade and shipping with Xiamen and Fuzhou City on the Chinese side. Yet when President Chen announced plans to relax the restrictions on Taiwanese companies’ investment

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4 The referendum failed to pass the threshold to be considered valid in the presidential election.
on China, a policy of “no haste, be patient” (jieji yongren) imposed by the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist) government in the mid-1990s, and replace it with a new policy of “active opening, effective management,” he also decided to restrict Taiwan’s top semiconductor producers—Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC) and United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC)—from migrating to China.

Having reviewed the Taiwanese perspective of national security and Taiwan-China relations, it is necessary to examine Beijing’s view. Virtually everyone in China was convinced that Taiwan was part of China and that the recovery of the island was a sacred and ultimate goal of the Chinese people’s struggle against “imperialism.” The recovery of Taiwan signifies the conclusion of the Chinese people’s struggle for national unity and territorial integrity. After the “recovery” of Hong Kong and Macao in 1997 and 1999 respectively, Taiwan became the only territory “lost” to imperialist powers in the nineteenth century that remained out of Beijing’s control. Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan is based on the so-called “one country, two systems” formula designed by the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Under this principle, Beijing would allow Taiwan to keep its administrative, legislative, and judicial powers, military forces, and economic system. Capitalism on Taiwan and socialism on the mainland could co-exist with each other and develop over time. 6 However, since the central government would remain in Beijing, Taiwan would have no right to represent itself in the international community.

Although the Taiwan issue had always been critical to China’s sacred goal of national unity, the recovery of Taiwan did not become an urgent issue until the 1990s, when elites began to consider the impact of on China of Taiwan’s

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6 Chen Qimao, “The Taiwan Strait Strait Crisis,” Asian Survey 36, no. 11 (November 1996), 1056.
eventual “separation from the motherland,” which had become a more likely scenario in the near future. Through an examination of the Chinese literature in this period, one could easily find that even a moderate scholar would become hawkish when the Taiwan issue was involved.7 One popular view in China during the 1990s was that the independence of Taiwan would lead to the collapse of the entire Chinese nation. Fearing that China would become another Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, the leaders in Beijing had no choice but to place state integrity and national pride as top priority, and the recovery of Taiwan became the ultimate goal for achieving national unity. The second view, by looking at the issue from a geopolitical perspective, interpreted the incentive for Taiwan independence as part of the U.S. grand strategy to contain the rise of China.8

When Chen Shui-bian was elected president of Taiwan in 2000, the primary concern for the leaders in Beijing was whether Chen and the DPP government would follow former president Lee Teng-hui’s step to further alienate the island from the mainland. Therefore, the Chinese government adjusted the strategy toward Taiwan by shifting the emphasis from promoting the “one country, two systems” formula to stressing the existence of the 1992 mutual understanding on One China. In the next four years, Chinese officials

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7 One example is Shi Yinhong, a prominent strategic scholar from Nanjing University. In a popular article published in Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management) in 2000, he warned about the huge political and economic costs that China would have to pay by recovering Taiwan through military means. Yet he also encouraged the leaders to continue a tough position toward Taiwan. See: Shi Yinhong, “Guanyu Taiwan de ji xiang bixu zhengshi de dazhanlue wenti” (Strategic Considerations on the Policy toward Taiwan), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management) 2000, no. 2, 27-32.

and government-controlled media kept demanding Taiwan to accept the One-China principle and to acknowledge the 1992 consensus, saying both were preconditions for cross-Strait dialogue.

In the economic sphere, the Chinese government continued to welcome Taiwanese businessmen to invest in the mainland, and kept soliciting the proposals of setting up direct travel and communication links between both sides. In January 2003, the Chinese government allowed Taiwanese charter flights to carry Taiwanese businessmen from Beijing and Shanghai back to Taipei for Lunar New Year vacation, the first direct flight between both sides in the past half-century. The success of the new-year charter flights did not create a friendly atmosphere for further reconciliation, however. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council rejected China’s call for negotiations between private companies from the two sides on direct transport links, but said such talks could be conducted via semi-official or official channels. Later Taiwan’s premier Yu Shyi-kun affirmed that direct links with China could only be realized through cross-Strait negotiations based on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, parity and dignity. The outbreak of the SARS disease in both Taiwan and China in the next few months further diminished the enthusiasm for “three direct links” in Taiwan, for many believed that cross-Strait contact would place Taiwan in an extremely vulnerable position when contagious diseases such as SARS were brought back to Taiwan through passengers or commodities.

The second element driving the relations between Taiwan and China is an economic one. It is estimated that from 1979 to 2000, Taiwanese firms had invested US$50.5 billion on China. By the end of 2003, China accounted for more than 47 percent of Taiwan’s approved outward investment in accumulation. In terms of cross-Strait trade, the Mainland Affairs Council of
Taiwan estimated that in 2003 China absorbed 24.5 percent of Taiwan’s total exports, compared to 16.8 percent in 2000 and 2.28 percent in 1987. Although Taiwan still maintains strict restrictions on direct trade with China, Chinese products account for 8.6 percent of Taiwan’s total imports, compared to 0.83 percent and 4.44 percent in 1987 and 2000 respectively. In 2003 China rose to become the largest trade partner of Taiwan (US$46.32 billion), while Taiwan was China’s second largest importing country (only next to Japan). In terms of capital flows and foreign direct investment (FDI), the figures are also remarkable. According to the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan, by the end of 2003 Taiwanese enterprises had invested US$34.3 billion on the mainland, accounting for 47 percent of Taiwan’s total overseas investment. Yet the real figure should be much higher—because of Taiwanese government’s restrictions on direct investment on the mainland, the capital had to be transferred via the third country. The Chinese government estimated that the capital from Taiwan through signed agreements and contracts had reached US$61.47 billion, making Taiwan the fourth largest source of foreign investments in China.

A recent report by the Economist also points out that Taiwanese companies also play a significant role in assisting China to become the second largest IT hardware producer in the world (only next to the United States): more than 60 percent of the exports in IT products are made by Taiwanese companies. Among the top 200 exporters in China in 2003, 28 are from Taiwan, and all of them are from high-tech industry, including numbers one to three: Hong Hai Precision (US$6.4 billion), Quanta (US$5.3 billion), and Asustek (US$3.2 billion).

The “China investment fever” was followed by huge flows of populations

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9 Figures obtained from the website of the Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan) [http://www.mac.gov.tw].
between both sides. More and more Taiwanese residents travel, or even migrate to the mainland. In 2002, the number of Taiwanese tourists reached a historical peak of 3.6 million, compared to 430 thousand when the travel ban was lifted in 1988. It is estimated that at least one million of Taiwanese are living or doing business on the mainland in the meantime. The figure of one million was first proposed by Chinese authorities and its accuracy was challenged, but it has been cited by various ministries as well as the media.\(^\text{11}\) According to the *Economist*, the Taiwanese companies employ some 10 million people on the mainland, which makes great contributions to the stability of the Chinese society, for unemployment has been one of the greatest concerns for Chinese leaders.\(^\text{12}\)

The third, and the most destabilizing, element in shaping Taiwan-China relations is the fragile military balance across the Taiwan Strait. In the past, it was believed that China did not have the capability to launch a massive invasion to occupy Taiwan. The assessment is now challenged by China’s growing military buildup and adjustments to its military strategy. China has deployed over 500 ballistic missiles along its southeastern coast, and the number is still increasing by 50-70 a year. Once launched, these missiles can reach targets within 10 minutes. Although missile attacks alone cannot force Taiwan into submission, there would be substantial psychological effects to the people of the island, and even force the Taiwanese government to the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, Taiwan only has three batteries of the PAC-2 Plus system, and has them deployed in the suburbs of Taipei. The PAC-2 Plus in Taiwan, also called Modified Air Defense System (MADS), is a more advanced version of

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\(^{12}\) “A Survey of Taiwan,” ibid., p.8.
the second-generation Patriot air-defense system. In 2001, the Bush administration decided to sell six batteries of PAC-3, a newer version of a lower-tier, land-based missile defense system, to Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan’s inclusion in the US-proposed Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system first arose in November 1997, when the US House of Representatives passed a bill (H.R. 2386) by a vote of 301-116, demanding the Secretary of Defense study and report to the Congress by July 1998 on the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region capable of protecting Taiwan from missile attacks, and the possibility of transferring the system to Taiwan. The bill was later incorporated into the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) in which the Congress required the Secretary of Defense to “conduct a study of architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a theater missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to protect key regional allies of the United States.” The key regional allies, according to the bill, include Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

When Chen Shui-bian became the president in 2000, his government demonstrated more interest in acquiring a missile defense system. In an interview with CNN in March 2001, Premier Chang Chun-hsiung argued that as long as China’s deployment of hundreds of ballistic missiles in Fujian province continued to pose a serious threat to Taiwan, it was legitimate for Taiwan to protect itself against possible missile attacks. President Chen Shui-bian made

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16 *Taiwan Daily* (Taiwan Ri Pao) (Taipei), March 23, 2001, 3.
a similar argument by emphasizing that since China’s military threat to Taiwan is imminent, a reliable missile defense system is crucial to the security of the island. In addition to the insistence on the right to acquire missile defense system for self-defense, a number of security experts asserted that Taipei should shift its focus from evaluating the possibility of joining in the development of the upper-tier programs in previous years to acquiring lower-tier systems first, particularly the sea-based AEGIS platform and PAC-3 missile defense system.18 There has been a debate among military experts over the necessity of purchasing four AEGIS destroyers as supplement to the existing land-based Patriot missile defense system. The advocates believe that a sea-based TMD system can provide an active defense against ballistic missiles on a mobile basis, while the opponents argue that AEGIS destroyer is too big and too expensive to meet Taiwan’s defense needs.

Because of Taipei’s shifting focus from an upper to a lower-tier missile defense system, the battle over TMD entered a new stage in April 2001, when the new Bush administration approached a deadline to decide whether to sell four AEGIS destroyers and PAC-3 missile defense batteries to Taiwan in the annual US-Taiwan arms talk. Before the final decision was made, Beijing expressed a serious concern over the issue, arguing that an approval of selling PAC-3 and AEGIS ships would only encourage the pro-independence movements on Taiwan and trigger an arms race across the Taiwan Strait. There were also considerable opposition voices within the Bush administration.19

18 Chung Chien “Lower-Tier TMD System is Necessary for the Security of Taiwan Strait,” The Forum of the New Century Think Tank (Hsin Shi Ji Chi Ku Lun Tan), No. 7 (Taipei), September 30, 1999, 86-90.
President Bush eventually did not approve the deal. Instead, he agreed to sell Taiwan four Kidd-class destroyers. Although Taipei finally accepted the offer, a number of opposition lawmakers still showed strong opposition to the purchase, arguing that Kidd-class ships cannot meet Taiwan’s defense needs and Taiwan should wait for another year to see if the US will be willing to sell the AEGIS system and PAC-3 missiles.\(^{20}\)

Taiwanese leaders understand that participation in the TMD system is different from previous arms sales between Taiwan and the US. An effective missile defense system will fundamentally transform the nature of military balance across the Taiwan Strait, and even incorporate Taiwan into an American missile defense network in the Asia Pacific. In the US, security experts and political leaders are aware of the threat Chinese ballistic missiles pose to Taiwan, and they believe strong Taiwanese defensive capabilities will probably force Chinese leaders to change its intimidation strategy. Consequently, the US government has maintained an ambiguous position on the possibility of incorporating Taiwan into the US-dominated missile defense system in the Asia Pacific in the future. In April 2002, Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, claimed that China’s continuous deployment of ballistic missiles against Taiwan would eventually force the US to consider boosting the island’s missile defense.\(^{21}\) Admiral Blair’s view demonstrated the US position: whether the US will transfer TMD to Taiwan will be determined by the balance of military capabilities across the Taiwan Strait.

Although most of the people in Taiwan consider China as an imminent security threat, not everyone agrees purchasing more arms from the U.S. will enhance Taiwan’s security. The arms package the Bush administration has


\(^{21}\) Agence France Presse, April 18, 2002. [http://www.taiwansecurity.org]
agreed to sell Taiwan, which includes eight diesel submarines, twelve P3-C anti-submarine aircraft, and six batteries of PAC-3 missile defense system, will cost 18.2 billion US Dollars, a sum which is about three times Taiwan’s annual defense budget. Because of the enormous cost, the arms purchase became one of the most hotly debated topics during the 2004 presidential election, and the budget has not been approved by the national legislature, where over half of the seats are occupied by opposition parties.22

The dispute over “One China,” the growing economic interdependence, and the fragile military balancing across the Taiwan Strait constitute three key features of Taiwan-China relations and Taiwan’s security. What worries the Taiwanese leaders is whether Beijing is using political, economic, and military measures interchangeably to force Taiwan to the negotiating table. Reports released in recent years indicate that such an intention does exist. In July 2002, the US Department of Defense submitted a report to the Congress on China’s military power. This report, titled “the Annual Report of the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” indicated that Beijing has developed a series of coercive options, including political/diplomatic, economic, and military measures, to force Taiwan into submission. Although the specific military strategy remains unclear, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is likely to “gradually escalate the military pressure in order to compel Taipei leaders to adopt policies favorable to Beijing’s interests.”23 Should China decide to use force against Taiwan, the report concludes, its primary goal is to defeat

22 In June 2004, Wang Jin-Pyung, the president of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and a prominent leader from the opposition KMT party, led a group of Taiwanese legislators to visit Washington to discuss the arms deal. The meeting was the highest-level meeting between U.S. defense officials and a Taiwanese leader since the Carter administration ended formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979.

Taiwan’s will of resistance in a short period of time so as to avoid intervention from the third party, namely the U.S. Another report, submitted by the Congressional US-China Security Review Commission and released to the public at the same time, made similar conclusions.24

Mainstream Approaches

To understand how Taiwan-China relations serve as a critical factor in determining Taiwan’s security situation, it is necessary to review the existing approaches concerning Taiwan-China relations developed by strategic analysts, policy-makers, and observers of Chinese or Taiwanese politics from academic communities. The most comprehensive overview of application of theories developed in political science and international relations to cross-Strait relations is a paper by Wu Yu-shan published on the Journal of Contemporary China in 2000. Wu introduces nine different approaches: the divided-nation model, integration theory, the power asymmetry model, the vote maximizing model, the developmental state paradigm, strategic triangle theory, systems theory, political psychological theory, and cognitive theory. According to Wu, all nine approaches can be further divided into three categories: strategic interaction, domestic politics, and international system.25 The paper implies the author’s ambition to bridge the gap between theory and empirical research, and to treat the cross-Strait relations as a topic for scientific research. Apparently


influenced by positivist epistemology, most of the approaches introduced in Wu’s paper tend to see the cross-Strait stalemate as an objective phenomenon that can be observed and explained by researchers, and certain law-like regularities concerning the interaction among the major actors, namely Taiwan, China, and the U.S., can be discovered. As Wu claimed: “Only by theorizing on cross-Strait relations can we get a firm grasp of the subject, and avoid being driven by ephemeral incidents and breaking news.”

With a closer look, one will find that only three approaches introduced in Wu’s paper are related to the security area: power asymmetry theory, strategic triangle, and the international systems approach. Each of them needs to be discussed in detail. The power asymmetry model claims that the defining features of Taipei-Beijing relations are “power-asymmetry” and “conflicting sovereignty claims.” Based on observations of the relationship between Russia and post-Soviet Union successor states, this model asserts that when facing political, economic, or military pressure from a hegemon (China), a smaller state (Taiwan) can only choose either “bandwagoning”— adopting policies to meet the interests of the hegemon, or “balancing”—seeking alliance with a third country to deter a possible attack from the hegemon. In the case of bandwagoning, the small state’s sovereignty is undermined, for the hegemon virtually has veto power over the small country’s decisions. Yet the small state will be able to maintain smooth relations with the hegemon. The strategy of balancing creates opposite effects: the small state’s sovereignty is protected, but it will become heavily dependent on the powerful ally, at least in military sphere.

The strategic triangle model was one of the more popular theories in

26 Ibid., 428.
27 Ibid., 43-415.
explaining the interactions among the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China during Cold-War years, but certain scholars found that the model could be applied to any triangle relation as long as all three states are rational, sovereign actors, the bilateral relationship among any two of them is affected by the attitude of the third state, and the relationship among three states are largely dominated by security and strategic issues. Wu further introduced various models developed by scholars to analyze the relationship between the U.S., China, and Taiwan, especially the role of the U.S. in Taiwan-China relations and Taiwan’s position in the triangle.

Influenced by structural realism of international relations theory, the international system approach suggests that the relationship between Taiwan and China should be examined under the circumstances of strategic interactions among major players in the international system. The nature of relationship among major players in the international system largely influences the behavior of China—which is increasingly considered a rising power in the international system—and strategies adopted by other great powers, the U.S. in particular, in dealing with China. Two primary strategies are identified: “curtailment” (anticipating an inevitable clash between the U.S. and China in the future) and “engagement” (expecting that confrontation between the two could be avoided), and they assign different roles to Taiwan. Taiwan’s security, in the eyes of international system approach advocates, is largely determined by American strategies toward China.

These approaches have had tremendous impact on studies of Taiwan’s security and Taiwan-China relations since 2000. Mainstream strategic scholars today continue to analyze Taiwan’s security in a context of strategic interactions.

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28 Ibid., 420.
29 Ibid., 424.
between two greater powers, China and the U.S. From Washington’s perspective, the greatest interest of the U.S. in this region is to avoid an outbreak of any military conflict between both sides. In doing so, policy makers and scholars from the U.S. have been particularly interested in finding a way to maintain the fragile peace rather than finding a solution to Taiwan-China deadlock. For instance, on the July/August 2001 issue of the *Foreign Affairs*, Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell, both senior strategic analysts from Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), wrote an article to warn the U.S. government about the possible military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. They argue that the leaders in Beijing today have become more impatient than their predecessors of the Taiwan issue, and have begun to set up a timetable for resolving the Taiwan issue by military means. They also point out that although various proposals aiming at avoiding misjudgment and miscalculation on both sides have been suggested by the academic community and even former policy makers from the US, none of these received positive responses from both sides.\(^{30}\) The suggestions Campbell and Mitchell offered are quite practical, but difficult to implement: the U.S. government should “help create incentives (and disincentives) that will encourage both Taipei and Beijing to maintain the undefined status quo—a middle ground between reunification and independence…. The U.S. must use its diplomatic skill and military muscle to dissuade the PRC from continuing its coercive course toward Taiwan and

\(^{30}\) These proposals include hot line, exercise notification, a joint air-traffic-control center, and signature of an interim agreement. As Campbell and Mitchell point out, Beijing’s strategy is to erode confidence and security in Taiwan. Thus any arrangement that might enhance Taiwan’s *de facto* independence is unacceptable to China. Taiwan has expressed more interest in such measures, but “it is unclear whether that interest is genuine or whether it is just a way to distinguish the ROC position from the mainland one, emphasized the authors. Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 4 (July/August 2001).
persuade it to pursue a more constructive and conciliatory approach… [and] to seek ways for Taiwan to participate in the international community.”

As the China observing community in the U.S. gradually reaches a consensus that keeping the status quo of the Taiwan Strait is the primary objective of the U.S. strategy toward the region, any unilateral move by either side will come to be considered dangerous and irresponsible. Thus it becomes reasonable to imagine that some scholars would start to criticize Taiwanese leaders for their decisions to hold a referendum during the 2004 presidential election, and the pledge to draft a new constitution for Taiwan in the near future. For instance, in a more recent article addressing the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, Michael Swaine points out that President Chen should be responsible for deterioration of Taiwan-China relations since 2000: “Taiwan’s leaders significantly shape, and do not merely reflect, the island’s sense of self-identity and population’s move toward self-determination… (President) Chen is using the referendum to bolster his standing with Taiwan’s voters and, perhaps even more important, may use it to create for himself a handy excuse for discouraging his original pledge not to alter the status quo.” These moves are considered by security strategists as attempts to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

All these approaches display a common problem: they are unable to address domestic factors in shaping the security considerations of Taiwanese leaders and the decisions they made to enhance Taiwan’s security. Nor do they tell us why most strategic analysts in Beijing and Washington D.C. continue to portray the relationship between Taiwan and China as conflictive by nature and to conclude that military confrontation between both sides is unlikely to

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31 Ibid.

improve in the near future. They all assume that China will definitely use force to avoid the loss of Taiwan, but they do not examine the social and economic conditions that might constrain Beijing leaders from pushing a missile attack and discourage Taiwanese leaders from declaring independence. What needs to be explained is not why Taiwanese leaders constantly make policies that irritate the leaders in Beijing but why such policies may seem contradictory to each other. The following section will first address the problem of “militarization” in the studies of Taiwan’s security and Taiwan-China relations, and then explore the possibilities of formulating an alternative approach to study the security of Taiwan.

Security vs. Economics: A Critical Perspective

The way a researcher constructs his or her understanding of Taiwan’s security determines his/her research focus and the chosen methodology. Virtually everyone in the field of political science or China studies attempts to consider the relationship between Taiwan and China as a problem that needs to be explained and solved. To solve the problem, a researcher is required to construct a core assumption (such as “Taiwan-China dispute may escalate into a military conflict in the near future”), an analytical framework (strategic interaction between China and the U.S.), and a solution (the U.S. should be able to effectively deter China from using force against Taiwan and dissuade Taiwan from declaring independence). This research, and the solutions they have offered are influenced by the researchers’ worldviews. This is despite that each person’s worldview might be (and often is) very different from that of others. Recently researchers of Chinese foreign policy have begun to examine how Chinese leaders construct their views of the outside world and how this
self-image or worldview influences China’s foreign policy behavior. For instance, Fei-ling Wang’s work on Chinese self-image attributes the government’s over-emphasis on national security in recent years to a strong sense of insecurity among Communist leaders. The paternalistic political culture and authoritarian nature of the political system also allows political leaders to transform this siege mentality into defending the national interest of the Chinese state. 33

When a scholar from American academic community studies the problem of Taiwan, he or she is likely to place focus on how the tension between Taiwan and China can be managed rather than finding a way to reconcile the differences between both sides. From American perspective, keeping the status quo of the Taiwan Strait meets the interests of the U.S., because by doing so the U.S. government may continue developing economic and strategic relations with Beijing while keeping the promise of safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy. Of course it is not easy to do so. As Campbell and Mitchell state: “Washington’s official relations with Beijing on the one hand and it’s unofficial relationship with Taiwan on the other hand represent perhaps the most complex foreign-policy balancing act in the world today.” 34

If a researcher’s worldview is established upon an assumption that Taiwan-China relations is *conflictive* by nature and status quo is the best way to safeguard Taiwan’s democracy, one may further conclude that the analyses of Taiwan’s security are conditioned by certain *ideas* created and shared by all policy makers, strategic analysts, and academic scholars in the field. The ideas encourage everyone to interpret the nature of Taiwan-China relations in certain

34 Campbell and Mitchell, ibid.
ways and limit their imaginations. Central to the debate about Taiwan-China relations is the idea of national security. Taiwanese people consider the relationship between Taiwan and China as a national security issue because Beijing’s claim of recovering Taiwan, by using force if necessarily, threatens the lives, properties, and the common values shared by the residents on the island. For the Chinese leaders, Taiwan is a national security issue because Taiwan’s eventual separation from the motherland will not only trigger a series of separation movements within China, which might further make the nation disintegrated, but also undermine China’s strategic position in the great-power competition with the U.S. and Japan. In the eyes of American strategists, Taiwan is a national security issue because if the U.S. permits Beijing to use force to take over Taiwan, the U.S. credibility and its support for democracy will be greatly undermined. American strategic superiority in East Asia may no longer exist.

From this perspective, the endless fear of the China threat in Taiwan is no longer a source of trouble that needs to be tamed, as certain academic scholars and strategic analysts in Beijing, Washington D.C. have advocated, but a situation created and modified by certain historical forces in the process of the island’s integration into the international economic and political system. One should just look at how certain social and economic conditions drive the relations between Taiwan and China to evolve into the current, confrontational stage to realize why a “militarized” conception of national security is now deeply rooted the mind of the leaders from both sides of the conflict and the scholars studying them. As Keith Klause and Michael Williams state: Grasping the contemporary meaning and nature of security means coming to terms with the historical dynamics that constitute contemporary world politics, and the way in which security is understood within the dominant modes of contemporary
Applying this critical perspective to the studies of Taiwan’s security, one will find that the nature of the relations between Taiwan and China are constantly shaped by two forces. Each of them represents a dominant ideology created in the process of social and economic evolution and shared by the leaders from powerful states over the past decades. The first is justification of sovereign state as the primary unit in international relations. Although the claim remains one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary international relations, it is no denying that political leaders in both Taiwan and China have long perceived state sovereignty as the most important element in maintaining independence and security of the society in the contemporary world. According to Wu Xinbo, a political scientist from the Center of American Studies of the Fudan University of China, there are three reasons for designating “state” as the primary referent object of security. First, the state has been viewed as the “protector” of the people; second, even in modern times China has never generated a mature civil society vis-à-vis the state; third, even since the establishment of the People’s Republic, the CCP has tried to created a unified social-political order and a highly centralized political structure, further strengthening the superior status of the state.

Designating the sovereign state as the primary and the most powerful institution providing security for a society by the leaders from both sides of the Taiwan Strait makes it virtually impossible for any political leader to consider the possibility of creating a new political entity comprising both Taiwan and

China. When President Chen proposed to use the European Union model to solve the political differences between Taiwan and China, he also emphasized: “The national sovereignty, safety and dignity enshrined in the Constitution (of the ROC) should not be compromised by any form of political integration between the two sides.” A similar case can be found in the remarks by Annette Lu, the Vice President of Taiwan, who called for abandoning the “One China” principle because “the spell of ‘One China’ dooms cross-Strait progress at every turn.” Lu suggested using the idea of One Chunghwa (One Chinese) to replace one China. The term Chunghwa refers more to the broadly defined ethnic entity comprising both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan but does not encompass other states with a large or predominant population of ethnic Chinese, such as in Southeast Asia.” Yet Lu also emphasized that “the people of Taiwan believe that it is already an independent, sovereign state…. The official name of which is the Republic of China.” Both President Chen and Vice President Lu’s remarks imply that safeguarding the sovereign of Taiwan is still considered as top and foremost security objective. The only difference between President Chen and his political rivals lies in different interpretations of the name of the nation—being it Republic of China or Taiwan.

The idea of safeguarding Taiwan as an independent sovereign, nevertheless, is now challenged by an economic force that drives both Taiwan and China in the same direction. Both Taiwanese and Chinese leaders face tremendous pressure from economic globalization, and such a trend will further compel them to take cautious steps to balance national security and economic interests. There have been a series of debates in the academic community about whether


globalization will bring fundamental changes to the political structure of the world, particularly the status of sovereign state. Nevertheless, even those who do not believe globalization will eventually bring down the states system cannot ignore the fact that increasing economic interdependence has made it easier for foreign influences to penetrate into domestic society than before, and has made individual societies more vulnerable to the changes of the external environment. From this perspective, the impact of globalization on a state depends on how a state formulates an appropriate strategy to deal with new challenges posed by globalization.

The people of Taiwan have mixed feelings about China. The Chinese mainland used to be portrayed by the KMT government as “lost territory” which would be recovered. But today the Chinese mainland is increasingly considered as either an aggressive power that never ceases the effort to capture Taiwan, or as a huge market full of business opportunities. Since Deng Xiaoping decided to open Chinese mainland society to the outside world in the late 1970s, we have seen dramatic changes in the country, highlighted by a rapid-growing economy and modernization of the society. From 1980 to 1998, China’s average GDP growth rate was over ten percent. Income per capita has grown by six percent, faster than in any other Asian country except South Korea in the same period. China’s share of world GDP has also reached ten percent, almost double that of 1979. Over one million of Taiwanese choose to study, work, or do business on the mainland not because they like Chinese political system or identify themselves as Chinese citizens but because they know China is a place full of business opportunities.

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The growth of the “China investment fever” in Taiwanese society has been identical to the advances of a native Taiwanese identity in that society. A survey conducted by Taiwan’s United Daily News in October 2003 revealed that 62 percent of the respondents said they were “Taiwanese” while only 19 percent of respondents identified themselves as “Chinese.” A similar survey conducted in 1989 found that only 16 percent said they were Taiwanese, whereas 52 percent said they were Chinese. In other words, neither Taiwan nor China is able to resist the power of globalization, because they have been both absorbed into the capitalist world economy. Rapid expansion of global trade and commerce to a large extent compel the leaders in Taipei and Beijing to take cautious steps in handling cross-Strait relations because their societies have become extremely vulnerable to a revolutionary change in the Taiwan Strait. A war would greatly undermine the economic bases of both societies thus damaging their relatively advantageous position in the global economy. In contrast to Vladimir Lenin’s powerful prediction a century ago that capitalism is the cause of war among capitalist advanced countries, capitalism can become the cause of peace in the Taiwan Strait today!

Interactions between these two forces constitute the deadlock as we see in the Taiwan Strait today. Taiwanese leaders are convinced that security of their society is established upon the state’s right to exercise complete jurisdiction over a defined territory. This conventional idea of sovereignty further pushes the leaders to strengthen the position that national security is superior to economic interests. In addition to emphasizing the growing missile threat and political pressure from China, Taiwanese leaders have also tried to use referendum and to claim the right to enact a new Constitution as “weapons” to strengthen the image that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state.

41 United Daily News (Taiwan), October 20, 2003.
President Chen and his supporters may believe that holding a referendum or enacting a new Constitution is the legitimate right for a democratic society to manifest its independent sovereignty.

At the same time, Taiwanese leaders are fully aware that Taiwan’s economy has become more and more dependent on the Chinese market in recent years and the trend is unlikely to reverse in the near future. This trend puts tremendous pressures on political leaders in Taiwan, because they are convinced that migration of Taiwanese capital and industries to the mainland may eventually hollow out the island’s economic base, thus placing Taiwan in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China. Economists may claim that retreat of the nation-state is a natural consequence in a highly integrated global economy, but many political leaders in Taiwan simply do not want to see Taiwan’s independence and integrity to be undermined by economic forces. The conflict between international economic forces and national security, once a hot debated topic in the field of international political economy, remains one of the greatest concerns for political leaders in Taiwan. 42

If we take this “state sovereignty vs. economic interest” distinction seriously, what will the future of Taiwanese security studies look like? The first approach is to evaluate how economic transactions across the Taiwan Strait — especially Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on China—affect political leaders’ estimates of Taiwan’s vulnerability in the security sphere. Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield examine difference trade patterns and find that when a state trades with friendly nations or military allies, it will enhance cooperative relations between the two. Trade with enemies or potential adversaries generate opposite effects because economic transactions as such

will divert economic resources from military areas to non-military ones, thus enhancing the potential military power of enemy states. \(^{43}\) Wei-chin Lee applies Gowa’s thesis to examine the impact of increasing asymmetry of Taiwan-China economic transactions on Taiwan’s domestic politics, and finds that there exists a conflict between Taiwanese government’s concerns over national security and the business community’s interest in division of labor and benefits of specialization through economic transactions. As Lee concludes: “The difficulty in reconciling economic integration with China and political separation from China means that Taiwan’s government policies seldom satisfy all constituencies.” Different zones of concentration in policy analysis lead to divergent conclusions.” \(^{44}\)

A second approach—the constructivist tradition—calls for an attention to the ideational factors in explaining international politics and that material resources only acquire their meaning for human action through the construction of the shared knowledge in which they are embedded. \(^{45}\) Constructivist scholars often argue that the concepts of threat and security are conditioned by a particular view on the issue, which have been the product of historical forces. Thus nuclear weapons do not constitute equal threat to all nations, and the degree of threat depends on who owns them. By applying the constructivist approach to the study of East Asian security, Muthiah Alagappa develops a proposition that ideational factors, especially the consideration of identity and historical legacy, can complement the Realist explanation of Asian security and provide a deeper understanding of the conflict and security concerns of Asian


\(^{44}\) Wei-chin Lee, “The Buck Starts Here: Cross-Strait Economic Transactions and Taiwan’s Domestic Politics,” *American Asian Review*, vol. 21, no.3 (Fall 2003), 145-146.

states. He points to the fact that material capabilities alone cannot explain some security issues that have been influenced by past history, such as the rivalry between China and Taiwan and between South and North Korea.  

Chien-min Chao’s study attempts to find out why growing economic transactions between Taiwan and China does not generate a pro-unification sentiment in Taiwan, as scholars of integration theory have predicted. He finds that different ideologies and strategies for economic development since 1949 have help created two different “political cultural identities” across the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan, as Chao argues, “features an emphasis on individualism, an embrace of local values, as opposed to those imported from mainland China, and a growing identification of Taiwan as a political community.” This new cultural identity justifies the wish for more political autonomy, and even eventual political separation from China. As long as indigenization continues to be an element driving the development of Taiwan’s political culture, and the identity crisis on the mainland also reduces the probability of formulating a reconciliatory policy toward Taiwan, “the two entities cannot come to any agreement, neither on issues with political implications such as the ‘one China’ policy nor on non-political issues.”

Conclusion: Future Security of Taiwan—Three Scenarios

For centuries students of international politics have tried to explain why hostilities between two societies may escalate into military conflicts, and how

47 Chien-min Chao, “Will Economic Integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to a Congenial Political Culture?” *Asian Survey*, Vol.43, No. 2 (March/April 2003), 304-304.  
48 Ibid.
to prevent them. Studies as such have developed into an important tradition in the theories of international relations today, security studies. The prolonged dispute between Taiwan and China, in the eyes of academic scholars and strategic analysts, fits perfectly into this tradition. This paper does not attempt to challenge the premises and achievements of the existing arguments and solutions proposed by other scholars, but to bring the discourse into a broader historical context. By bringing Taiwan’s pursuit of state sovereignty and economic forces into discussion, the paper reveals that a study of Taiwan’s security problem should not be confined to the military aspects, in which Taiwan’s survival is determined by either developing a enough military capability to deter China’s attack, or strategic relations between two greater powers, the U.S. and China. Regarding Taiwan’s future, there might be three scenarios.

The first scenario is that military balancing across the Taiwan Strait continues to dominate the decision-making circles and the community of strategic analysts, and economic interdependence and political disputes between both sides are totally ignored. This may lead them to interpret the situation as a classical case of “security dilemma.” The conventional understanding of “security dilemma” in international relations theory refers to a situation that military preparations in one state, aiming to protect itself from being conquered by others, may encourage its neighboring countries to take similar actions. An unintended action thus triggers an arms race across the entire region.49 The scenario is likely to happen when both sides in the dispute believe that force is the only option to prevent the other from changing the status quo. In the case of Taiwan, political leaders in Taipei may consider that China is preparing to use

force against Taiwan, which will leave Taiwan no option but to strengthen its defense capabilities or to develop offensive weapons as deterrent. Then the next question is how the U.S. may respond to the situation—assisting Taiwan to develop a credible deterrence capability, forcing Taiwan to give up the policy of confrontation, or warning Beijing that the U.S. will do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan.

The second scenario is that the leaders in Taiwan will prefer to strengthen its autonomy and independence in the international community by challenging the existing political order which some leaders believe is unfair to Taiwan. On the one hand, Taiwan will continue the campaign for membership in major international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and to seek participation in regional security dialogues and networks. On the other hand, Taiwan will continue challenging the legitimacy of “One China” principle and the “status quo,” both of which have been considered in Beijing and Washington D.C. as the basis of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.50 Taiwanese leaders may claim that the principles simply allow Beijing to claim sovereignty over Taiwan while rejecting Taiwanese people’s right to decide the island’s future. They may even propose to use

50 Joanne Chang, formerly a political scientist from Academia Sinica and now Deputy Representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S., recently challenges the meaning of the “status quo” defined by the U.S. Officials from the U.S. government today defines the status quo as “a state of peace and stability in the (Taiwan) Strait” and they believes that maintaining it requires that no party seek unilaterally to press its definition of sovereignty on the other.” However, as Chang points out, the U.S. government has not been consistent in defining the substance of the status quo. “From 1950 to 1978, the United States considered the status quo as the ROC representing the legitimate government of China. In 1979 the United States government drastically changed its policies and recognized the PRC as the only legitimate government representing China. The United States acted in terms of its own national interests but opted for a completely opposite expression of the status.” See Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, “New Dimensions of U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 26, no. 4 (August 2004), 309-315.
democratic means, such as holding referendum, revising the Constitution, or enacting new laws to change the official title to Taiwan, to demonstrate the fact that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state. This strategy has proven to be very effective in mobilizing pro-independence supporters in national elections. It will be more interesting to see how Beijing leaders react to such changes.

In the third scenario, one will see co-existence of both Taiwan industries’ enthusiasm in the Chinese market and a growing call for an independent national identity from China. The leaders will realize that Taiwan’s gradual integration into the Chinese economy is an inevitable trend, and the only thing they can do keep the level of opening up under control so as to retain an advantageous position in the strategic interactions with Beijing. Consequently, Taiwan’s policy toward China will move back and forth between the goals of pursuing national security and of economic interests. This may have two consequences. If the international community can convince Beijing to make certain gestures—such as removing the missiles targeting at Taiwan—or to help both sides set up a stable framework to ensure Taiwan’s safety, as certain strategic observers have advocated, it will greatly alleviate Taiwan’s suspicion of China and encourage Taiwan to adjust the policies toward the economic direction.51 Taiwanese leaders may decide to lift the ban on direct traffic between Taiwan and China and even announce to relax restrictions on Taiwanese companies’ investment on China in exchange for a stable Taiwan-China relationship. Yet if Beijing maintains the policy of attracting Taiwanese investment while refusing to abandon the intimidation strategy toward Taiwan, Taiwanese leaders will further perceive the growing asymmetry of Taiwan-China economic transactions as a national security issue and adopt a more

hostile policy toward China.

It is not easy to tell which scenario is more likely to happen, yet observers of Taiwan-China relations should not be too optimistic about Taiwan’s future. Instead, they should encourage the government of Taiwan to look at the growing economic interdependence in a more positive way and to encourage the government of China to seriously consider Taiwan’s request for mutual respect in bilateral relations. One thing is certain: if both sides see the other side as an enemy and adopt a defensive position toward each other, it will only fuel belligerent sentiments in both societies. In other words, the academic community does have the responsibility to guide the direction of Taiwan-China relations toward a real reconciliation, rather than predicting the possibility of a military conflict. The people of Taiwan and the common values they created and cherish—not the state or regime—are what needs to be secured. As the questions like “security for whom?” and “security for what?” have been constantly ignored by mainstream literature on the security of Taiwan, now it is time for scholars to bring them into the forefront.52

繁榮或安全？台灣的國家安全 2000-2004

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摘要

台灣與中國之間日漸緊密的經濟互賴究竟是區域經濟整合的成功範例還是台灣國家安全上的重大漏洞？政治學者與經濟學者分別提供了不同的答案，而台灣政壇上統獨兩大勢力的消長也往往影響了決策者對此一問題的判斷。本文認為：一個政治經濟學的觀察角度將能使我們從過去專注在強權間軍事戰略關係的研究方式轉移到當前國際政治經濟體系下一個更根本的問題，也就是經濟全球化與國家主權之間的關係。經濟富裕與國家安全是過去數百來所有主權國家所共同追求的目標，而二者之間也一直保持着平衡關係。但全球化是否將完全推翻過去國際政治與經濟秩序的運作規律？主權國家對此將如何回應？檢視台灣與中國之間在政治、經濟、與軍事的互動過程或許能帶給我們一些解答。

關鍵字：國家安全、台灣-中國關係、主權、經濟相互依賴