

Japan's Rise vs. China's Rise*

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Abstract

There is no forever power in human history. The rising East Asia vs. Western model seems to reemerge. China is rising. The sun is rising too. It is the first time in history for both nations being strong at the same time. Japan is an old giant in East Asia. After falling asleep for hundreds of years, the China dragon has wakened up and become an expected star in the 21st century. The stable Japan-China relationships are not only for East Asian happiness today, but also for their success tomorrow. Japan and China are enjoying the complementary economic relationships, but it is a totally different picture in the political and military fields. This kind of relationship is called "politics cold and economies hot."

The increasing China's military threat and worsening Japan-China relationships are forcing Japan-U.S. alliance to become closer. This context has made Japan as the spokesman of U.S. in the East Asia. A typical example is the first East Asian Summit. Because U.S. is not officially invited to join the first East Asian Summit, Japan fulfils its role of spokesman to insist the importance of U.S. participation positively. Japan intends to ally with U.S. to cope with China's domination power.

However, Japan's future and that of China are closely linked. Both

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leaders have wisdom to create the win-win results. Realistically, Chinese government is pessimistic about the future of Japan-China relationships. Japanese hard-liners are rising. The strongest candidate for post-Koizumi, called Shinzou Abe, is also a hard-liner toward China. Consequently, it is not easy to mitigate the Japan-China conflicts in the post-Koizumi times. Furthermore, the Japan-China relationships are shifting from “politics cold and economies hot” to “politics cold and economies cool.”

Keywords: Godzilla, dragon, alliance, standard, compatibility

Introduction

In human history, no country can hold the supremacy forever. The power shift is a never-ending process (Toffler, 1990). In the 19th century, the world economic power center was in Western Europe, and then it shifted to U.S. in the 20th century. In the 21st century, the East Asia is rising. Japan is an East Asia's old giant. After falling asleep for hundreds of years, the China dragon has wakened up and become a rising star. The woken dragon is causing Godzilla's celebration and anxiety simultaneously. China has superseded U.S. to become Japan's largest trade partner in 2004. Japan's economic prosperity and stability depend on its regional cooperative relationships with China and other East Asian countries. Following the emerging of EU and NAFTA, the regional economic integration has become a great trend in East Asia. Japan is exploring the possibility of East Asian Community, which is based on a prototype of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Of course, this time the driving power is not the military, but the economic force (Abegglen, 2004: chapter 9). The leadership competition within the East Asian Community is another chapter of the unrest Japan-China relationships.

Recently, China's political and military rises have drawn attention from Japan and other countries. Japan-China rivalry is lingering and the tension is inevitable. The recent anti-Japan protests in April in China have proved the depth of historical enmities. The Japan-U.S. alliance serves as a cornerstone for Japan's security and defense strategy. Although the alliance context is changing, however, China's military modernization and North Korea's nuclear program are Japan and U.S.'s common strategic objectives. Although U.S. is not an East Asian country, no country can neglect its powers. Because Japan

is an East Asian nation, it does not neglect the importance of other East Asian countries. Japan still can keep the balance between the East Asian strategies and the Japan-U.S. alliance at the present time. The big question is that can Japan use the current structure to keep this balance in the future (Abegglen, 2004: chapter 9). Thus, this paper's purpose is to use the U.S. as a third power to decode the context of Japan Godzilla vs. China dragon.

The Rising East Asia vs. Western Model

Everything is changing, except the change itself. There is no forever power in the world. The U.S. has kept the single most powerful country in the world for a long time. U.S. standard always becomes the de facto global standard naturally. The rise of East Asia is the third great shift in global power (Zakaria, 2005: 16). The East Asian countries have achieved strong economic interdependence relationships, so a new economic regionalism is emerging. Japan and China are the two leading engines and competing for the regional hegemonic powers. Both Japan and China contend for the support of U.S.-led global standard.

In the standard competition, because each country makes the foreign policy for its national interests, "compatibility" is the most important key word for decision-making. If the national interests are compatible, then they will support each other's policy (Grindley, 1990). Otherwise, they will use any excuse to fight against each other. U.S., Japan, and China focus on using compatible interests to win broad support. Hard power is still a key factor, but the importance of soft power is increasing (Nye, 2004). There is an old Chinese saying that "foe's foe is your friend." Cooperating with friend and competing with foe is logical, but the problem is that how we can define who is

friend and who is foe? One country can hold many roles. One country can be a friend and a foe simultaneously. Furthermore, today's friend may be tomorrow's foe, due to shift in alliance. Sometimes the foe's action will help you, but the friend's movement can hurt you ridiculously.




Figure 1: The Analysis Framework of Rising East Asia vs. Western

The U.S.-led global standard has its limits and compatibility problems. Japan is competing with China for the regional leadership role, but both of them agree the importance of integrating the East Asia. Sometimes, the regional standard is not compatible with U.S.-led global standard. U.S.-led standard becomes Japan and China's common competitor. Thus, the pure competition is dead. Japan and China are exploring co-evolution and radically new cooperative/competitive relationships in the standard competition. Their relationships are dynamic. No matter what, "are their national interests compatible?" is the useful lens to study the *co-opetition*¹ relationships (Figure 1).

¹ Co-opetition is a combined word of cooperation and competition. See Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996).

Economic Interests Approach

Basically, the *co-opetition* relationships can be divided into economic interests and national security. At first, this paper uses the lens of economic interests to study this East Asian odd couple.

The core of U.S.-led global standard is the economic prosperity. The global economic growth still relies heavily on the U.S.'s spending, but the influence is gradually weakening. The U.S. had achieved the much-envied New Economy with IT revolution in the last decade, but it is suffering from the gigantic budget and trade deficits, called twin deficits. Although we are not sure whether the U.S.-led economic global standard is replaceable or not, its influence is relatively weakening. "A dip in U.S. productivity provokes anxious questions. The biggest one: does it signal the end of the global boom? By all accounts, the New Economy died three or four years ago" (Miller, 2005).

On the other hand, East Asian economic powers are continuously rising. Especially, China dragon has become the growth engine for the world economies, which is a historic turning point for Japan, U.S., and other countries. A new China's rise has become the popular special reports for many international magazines recently. According to *Newsweek*, published on May 9, 2005, "China's economic output, in trillions. It's expected to triple over the next 15 years, overtaking Japan in 2015 and the U.S. by 2039" (Zakaria, 2005). *TIME* June 27, 2005 also published a special report to analyze China's rise. It made a similar conclusion. China is no longer a very big and poor country. China's high economic growth has helped Japan's recovery. China completely dominates the low-cost manufacturing industries and become the world factory, and then world market. China is using its economic dominance and political

skills to replace Japan's traditional East Asian leadership and challenge the U.S.'s global supremacy.

Of course, there are some controversies. "Developing countries that do well in one decade more often than not fail in the next" (Miller, 2005: 40). The pressure of bubble economy is increasing, especially in the aspect of real estates. The coastal areas have achieved high economic growth, but the inland areas do not enjoy the economic fruits. This imbalance of economic development will cause social instability. China must keep high economic growth to hold the social stability. Although China faces above difficulties, which could cumulate into big problems in the future, at least it can keep the high economic growth nowadays.

Both Japan and China are eager to achieve the establishment of East Asian regional economic integration, but U.S. feels being excluded. Without the U.S., this community could be dominated by China in the future, and then China's hegemony could challenge U.S.'s position in East Asia. "China's dominance and loss of American influence" is the U.S.'s anxiety (Gyohten, 2005). The East Asia economic integration can reduce regional tension and relieve American security burden, so this regional integration is compatible with U.S.'s national interests.

In modern history, China suffered from foreign invasion, civil wars, and the Cultural Revolution. Now the young Chinese are building a new country they are proud of. China is taking a place among the great powers and its people gain respect. The growing market is a newly found paradise for the world goods, of course including Japanese ones. The wealthy Chinese are the targeted potential visitors. Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance) was an important resource for China's development, but now that carrot is no longer very important for China's economic development. Japan achieved its

economic miracle by export-led growth and keeping its domestic market closed. China chose to open its market to the whole world.

It is not surprising that the low-priced “Made in China” products flood Japanese stores. But China is still not the main competitor for Japan. Japan’s main East Asian competitors are South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. On the other hand, China’s main rival is ASEAN, because their industrial development level is about the same. Japan’s industries are upgraded toward high value added fields, especially the parts industries. Japanese managers call themselves as a “parts country.” Japan exports a lot of parts and equipments to China. Japan and China are cooperating for East Asian prosperity with the model of Japanese “parts country” + Chinese “world factory” and “world market.” The good news for Japan’s policymakers is that Chinese workers have enjoyed the economic fruits (Beech, et al., 2005: 32). But the bad news is that Chinese workers are gradually unsatisfied with the working environment.

Japan’s economic dominant power is shifting toward China’s side, but even so there are many strategic reasons for both sides to avoid any immediate escalation of tension. We cannot forget that although China’s economic scale can surpass Japan in the future, Japan economic size is still bigger than China now. In order to gain the dominance, China will keep cooperating with the Japan’s economic ties.

The U.S. used “Japan bashing” toward the strong Japan in the 1980s. The Japan bashing by the U.S. policymakers had become a convenient scapegoat to divert attention from their near-sighted policies, which were the real roots causing American economic recession in the 1980s. It was much easier to blame Japan than to admit their fault and take the responsibility. In the 1990s, U.S. economy was very strong, but Japanese economy was weak. Ironically, American used the word of “Japan passing” or “Japan nothing” to jeer Japan.

U.S. policy elites have pinned the blame on Japan's slow economic growth as the cause of the world's financial problems until recently.

Now it is China's term. U.S. is suffering the increasing trade deficit problem with China. The U.S. now uses "China bashing," which is similar to the Japan bashing of 1980s. Bashing the Chinese seems to be politically correct when Washington needs a scapegoat again. This kind of China bashing policy is seen in Tokyo, too. The appreciation of China's yuan, also called renminbi, is a typical one. Japanese yen had similar experience before. Because the U.S. suffered the trade deficit with Japan, it wanted yen to be appreciated. After the Plaza Accord of 1985, the yen appreciated rapidly. Unfortunately, this yen appreciation was the biggest reason to cause Japanese bubble economy.

On July 21, China ended its decade-old peg to the dollar and let the yuan fluctuate versus a basket of currencies, responding to criticism from the U.S., Japan, and Europe that their currency was undervalued. Letting the yuan appreciate may help President Hu Jintao control inflation by reducing the cost of imported products such as oil, which is priced in U.S. dollars. Permitting the yuan to trade more freely could also moderate criticism from the Bush administration and some Congress members that blame China's currency policy for a record trade deficit and the loss of manufacturing jobs. Because of the trade and investment, Japan and China are deepening economic relations. If China stabilizes foreign relation by yuan appreciation, it is a desirable result for Japan, too. Japan welcomes China's movement (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 22, 2005; Kuramitsu, 2005). China has learned from yen's bad experience of rapid appreciation and chooses the gradual appreciation for yuan.

China's economic attractiveness had overshadowed its other potential risks, but those anti-Japan protests in April were the alarms. The demonstrators called for boycotting Japanese goods and destroying Japanese stores. They

hated Japan. Some Japanese stores hung China's national flag to protect themselves. Some Japanese covered their billboards and logos. Japanese companies denied supporting right-wing party. Consequently, the general Japanese people are afraid of the unrest nowadays. These anti-Japan protests are also the catalyst for Japanese to change their investment attitudes. The psychological impact on Japanese companies was small, but it was a trigger. They hesitate to invest in China. Japanese companies are looking for alternative investment places. India is the answer (Friedman, 2005). Meanwhile, China is also improving its relationship with India.

On July 20, Japanese government submitted *White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2005*. According to this report, because Japan is experiencing declining birthrate and aging population, it is important to strengthen cooperation with East Asia for Japanese economic growth. With that in mind, this paper points out that China holds a key of economy in the region, but its issues of overheated investment and other structure problems become more critical. This report sounds an alarm bell in a rising business risk of the Japanese company in China (pp. 10-25).

The White Paper analyzes that a growth factor of Chinese economy depends on fixed assets investment such as infrastructure. It is assumed that investment overheat is a factor to cause (1) price rise through the rising price of materials and energy, (2) worsening shortage of electricity, (3) raising real estate price, (4) bad debt problems, and (5) over-supply. This report enumerates the new bad debts of real estate, an infringement of intellectual property rights, and deficiency of legislation degree as future concern materials. The intellectual property poaching is a common problem in China, and it seems to be unsolvable in the near future. A Japanese company is based on such a risk and should work out a strategy to find the most suitable production location in

East Asia, including China and ASEAN (pp. 10-25, 156-77).

The globalization of Japanese companies is not a root-less process of constantly moving factories to lowest-wage countries. If really so, an African wage would be the cheapest and Africa should have been the place Japan moves its factories to. In the future, investing in China for Japanese may be more difficult than it appears now.

National Security Approach

In the economic field, the movement to grope for Japan-China complimentary growth is the mainstream. Unfortunately, it is a totally different picture in the political and military fields. The China dragon hates Godzilla from the bottom of its heart. Following the economic achievement, Chinese expose their hatred toward Japan. Japan is very concerned about China's military modernization and allies with U.S. to release this anxiety. The worsening Japan-China relationships are a new source of tension in the East Asia. The Japan-U.S. alliance is the world's strongest bilateral alliance. Their division of responsibility is "SDF (Self-Defense Forces) as a shield, U.S. forces as a sword." China's military modernization is pushing this alliance closer than before. This context has made Japan as the spokesman of U.S. in the East Asia. The typical example is the first East Asian Summit. U.S. was not officially invited to participate in the first East Asian Summit, but Japan acts the role of spokesman positively to insist the importance of U.S. participation repeatedly.

The closer Japan-U.S. alliance was also proved in the joint statement of February 29, 2005 again. It was the first time that Japan and U.S. had officially named the Taiwan Strait as a common strategic objective. Japan used to prefer euphemism and use ambiguous words such as "in areas

surrounding Japan” to express its stance in a potential Taiwan-China crisis. Although it is almost impossible for China to invade Japan, Japan is the alliance partner of the U.S. The U.S. has pledged to help Taiwan defend itself against China’s force attack. Thus, Japan has become the strategic target for China to check. To Japan, helping Taiwan is like taking a vaccine for a rainy day. If Japan is attacked by North Korea, the U.S. would help Japan. Now the U.S. needs Japan’s support for the East Asian stability, so Japan must do something in the peaceful times.

However, Japan is transforming its self-righteous passive pacifism to positive pacifism. Japan is also changing its defense strategy and plans to upgrade and revamp its military forces, even though the cold war had ended. Japan plans to invest on the costly missile defense. Japan has already cooperated with the U.S. on basic research. Japan does not need the missile defense to fight against terrorist attacks. From a different logic perspective, Taiwan and North Korea are Japan’s excuses to imply that China is the real target.

The Japan-China relationships are going through a big change in the daytime. Japan is standing at turning points from an old paradigm of friendship diplomacy to new approach. Traditionally, Japan’s China policies had some characteristics. Primarily whenever China raised a problem about the miserable history problems, Japanese felt a sense of guilt for the past, considered it and settled by a low profile such as apology. Japan tried to deepen a friendly relationship through financial support (*Asahi Shimbun*, May 25, 2005, p. 13).

Now a new change has appeared. A sense of guilt for the past is fading away, and the young Japanese came to insist on Japanese national interest openly. The times of financial support for China were virtually over, too. Of course China holds an economic power, too, and does not need the support. Furthermore, Japanese do care about Chinese concern like before when they

magnify the role in Japan-U.S. security treaty. On the contrary, the Chinese military modernization has enforced Japan-U.S. alliance, and it is a factor to strengthen Japanese defense capacity. Now Japanese foreign policies lean toward Taiwan slightly, such as allowing Japan visit of the Lee Teng-hui former President, supporting Taiwanese WHO observer participation, and announcing joint statement of February 29. The “one China” base has not changed, but its military vagueness is diluting (*Asahi Shimbun*, May 25, 2005, p. 13).

Japan is increasingly enforcing its diplomatic and armed forces through cooperating more closely with U.S. Thus, China is worrying that Japan and U.S. are cooperating to contain China's growing influence in East Asia and beyond. The U.S.'s plan of troop reduction in East Asia and the burden of Iraq war have induced some worries. The U.S. officials insist that they need a more flexible force to counter terrorism threat and they will not leave East Asia alone (*Economist*, February 26, 2005, p. 27).

On June 4 in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld accused “China's defense expenditures are much higher than Chinese officials have published. Since no nation threatens China...why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases? Why these continuing robust deployments?” The next day, Rice said U.S.-China “relations are at their best ever, and the Chinese are engaged in military buildup, and that buildup is concerning” (*Time*, June 27, 2005, p. 32).

On June 30, the U.S. government explained a scenario of Taiwan Strait emergency and expressed that it is difficult for the marine battle corps to reduce or move out the Okinawa base, because these forces are indispensable as a deterrent for China's special forces invading Taiwan. Japanese government received this and discussed other reduction such as logistical support corps except a battle corps with request. According to Japanese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, most of the Okinawa Marine Corps are considered to be a battle corps with about 18000. Now about 3000 are dispatched in Iraq. United with vessels and a helicopter, the U.S. forces hold the ability to develop in Taiwan by around one day (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 30, 2005).

The U.S. side's analysis shows that China reinforces the short-range ballistic missiles and Russia fighter planes to establish military predominance for Taiwan and trains the large-scale landing. But using the armaments of such large-scale army and air forces is a big risk to develop for full-scale war with U.S. In contrast, a scenario of dispatching the special force can check the U.S. Armed Forces by avoiding a large-scale battle. It is an effective way to control Taiwan in a short term. If the U.S. forces cannot reach Taiwan within a few days, they could lose an opportunity. However, taking advantage of Japanese territorial waters invasion case by a Chinese nuclear submarine of November, last year, U.S. side judged that "it is necessary to maintain conformity ability of the Marine Corps of Okinawa as a deterrent for China" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 30, 2005).

On July 19, the Pentagon announced a new annual report and indicated that China's national defense budget is 2-3 times more than officially announced. Over the longer term, however, an increasingly modernizing Chinese military could pose a "threat" to outskirts area. As for the Chinese missile, a range and improvement of precision are planned. This report states that the issue of securing energy resources becomes a big element in Chinese strategic decision. Moreover, this report warns that China's expansion of armaments could jeopardize regional military balance.

China's growing military is grabbing headlines on Japanese defense-related reports, too. The contents of *Defense of Japan 2005* were announced on July 2, 2005. This report shows that China plans the modernization of

armaments with “military strategy of positive defense” and strengthens activity in the open sea by nuclear submarines. Thus, the *Defense of Japan 2005* concerns and suggests “watch the trend closely about activity of China navy vessel.” It is a characteristic that this white paper of 2005 has added more description about China. Growth of the Chinese war expenditures exceeds growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the military budget grows more than 10% for successive 17 years. This white paper assumes that China takes “military strategy of positive defense” and Japan strengthens a feeling of alert. With that in mind, the Chinese armed forces match a pace with development like a gas field and can go ahead through the naval open sea (Japan Defense Agency, 2005).

Furthermore, the white paper explains the territorial waters invasion case by the Chinese nuclear submarine in November, last year. It points out that “security of transparency” is important for activity of China side while the concern level of Japanese ordinary people to marine activity by China at Japanese territorial waters rises. In addition, it expresses concern about nuclear development and missile experiment by North Korea and so on. The white paper explains measures to defend against ballistic missile attack (Japan Defense Agency, 2005).

Comparing these two reports, this paper has found some of their common concerns. Of course, China's military modernization is their biggest subject. “Some of China's military planners are surveying the strategic landscape beyond Taiwan.” “Over the longer term, however, an increasingly modernized Chinese military could pose a threat to U.S. and other forces in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both reports doubt about the transparency of China's annual military budget and concern about its growth rate. Two reports also focus on a number of Chinese new capabilities, including missile improvement and a naval buildup.

The issue of securing energy resources becomes a big element in Chinese strategic decision. Finally, both reports remind Japan to be slightly more cautious of China's military buildup (The Associated Press, 2005).

The recent anti-Japan protests in China have shown that the anti-Japan sentiments are deeply rooted in the general Chinese people's minds. Many articles argue that China's government is using the anti-Japan nationalism. According to *Newsweek*, May 9, 2005, China is "having abandoned communism, the Communist Party has been using nationalism as the glue that keeps China together. And modern Chinese nationalism is defined in large part by its hostility toward Japan" (Zakaria, 2005, p. 21). *TIME*, June 27, 2005, also wrote "since the democracy movement exposed fissures in Chinese society 16 years ago, the government has tried to supplement a fading communist ideology with nationalism through a concerted education and media campaign." The anti-Japan sentiments are pervasive among Chinese ordinary people. There are many anti-Japan websites. The online patriotism is enforcing China's nationalism. It is much more difficult to be controlled than the traditional media. The anti-Japan dragon, once released, could prove hard for government to restrain (p. 39).

However, rise of nationalism of the two countries is slightly dangerous in the daytime. Nationalism is a process of power shift by Chinese rise. Historically, the rise of a new large country would bring instability and lead to wars, so it is difficult to manage a power shift by the prosperity of nationalism (The Associated Press, 2005).

China had an anti-American demonstration in 1999 in response to the bombing of China's Belgrade embassy by American aircraft during the Kosova war, but it was calmed down immediately, when the Beijing government expressed that enough was enough. These recent anti-Japan protests have

proved that Japanese brutal invasion is not solved yet. It is hard for the Beijing authority to control. Reconciliation between these two countries is almost impossible. China accuses that "it is because Japan does not reflect carefully." These affairs approved that if China has a war with Western country unfortunately, it will take ten years for both sides to be reconciled, but it takes one hundred years between China and Japan.

Ironically, China helps Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to pass and implement some policies. It sounds ridiculous. This paper uses the Koizumi-China-opposite member triangle framework to explain the cause-and-effect relationships. Because Prime Minister Koizumi is a hard-liner to China, tension between Godzilla and dragon cannot be calmed down during his remaining term. Besides, no conflict is not in a normal condition. The occasional political stalemate is inevitable. One country leader could make a negative decision easily, when his approval rating is low. The logic is "Don't change horse in the middle of the stream."

China's government and the general people hate Prime Minister Koizumi very much. There are some opposite members against Prime Minister Koizumi. Especially, the Okada ex-leader of opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has took the pro-China strategy to accuse Prime Minister Koizumi's East Asia policies. Mr. Okada accuses that Prime Minister Koizumi causes the anti-Japan activities and ruins Japan's national interest, so he insists to enhance China's weight in Japan. Thus, we can conclude that China and the opposite members are standing on the same side against Prime Minister Koizumi. Beijing government does use the strategy of allying with opposition party and pro-China member to contain Prime Minister Koizumi. These anti-Japan actions have given Prime Minister Koizumi many rational reasons to sell his policies. Even the opposition party cannot say good words for China and

against Prime Minister Koizumi in this kind of weird situation. Consequently, China has become Prime Minister Koizumi's partner to oppose the opposition party. But the Maehara new leader of opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is also a hard-liner toward China and calls China as a "real threat."

Koizumi's office term will be expired this year. The strongest candidate for post-Koizumi, called Shinzou Abe, is also a hard-liner toward China. Consequently, it is not easy to mitigate the Japan-China conflicts in the post-Koizumi times. Instead of calling Koizumi route, we should call Japan's recent strategies toward China as Japanese route.

Is Japan or China U.S.'s True Love?

Is the Japan or China U.S.'s true love? The U.S. loves Japan or China more. Japan is not absent from the great trend of regional integration. Japan cannot prosper without East Asian countries. Its economic strategy maps are shifting from U.S.-centered to East Asia-centered. Japan and East Asian countries, including China, are enjoying the juicy fruits of economic interdependence. The powerful dragon keeps challenging Japan Godzilla. Godzilla is wondering what the dragon will become and where it is going? Is it a time for showdown and payback? The traces of their fighting are left in Shanghai, Beijing, Yasukuni Shrine, Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington. When the economical and political problems are separately argued as above, they are much simple. Following the East Asia's rise, Japan will gradually shift the weight of foreign policy to the East Asian and explore the future of Japan-U.S. alliance from now on.

There is an old Chinese saying that a mountain cannot allow two tigers to live together. As the saying goes, we must ask if there is enough space for two

giants in the East Asia. The rising dragon is threatening Japan Godzilla's leadership in East Asia. Zero-sum is only one result. The East Asian game can result win-win, win-lose, and lose-lose results. The rising dragon can co-evolve with Japan. For example, China acts as an intermediary in the six-party talks, even U.S. and Japan depends on its mediation (*Economist*, February 26, 2005, p. 27).

Thus, Japan is deliberating its alliance with U.S. and the apprehension of the threat of China. Japan is also considering how far China can accept the further development of Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan's strengthening independent self-defense system. Because of the hostile political and military relationships between Japan and China, Japan needs to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance for the worst. However, the large-scale military war between Japan and China is impossible. No one can stand the destructive power of modern weapons, but the small confliction is unavoidable. Japan must keep asserting its importance for the U.S. Japan does supply the military bases and capital resources for U.S. Japan can use these resources to negotiate with U.S. Japan must keep the balance between the East Asian economic interest and U.S. military power. Japan cannot forget that it is one member of the East Asia. Otherwise, Japan could be excluded from the East Asia politically (Abegglen, 2004, chapter 9). A Japan rooted in East Asia is more valuable than an isolated one for the U.S.

Until today Japan does limit its defense capability and rely on the Japan-U.S. alliance for its national security. This strategy has forced Japan to hand over its national security decision to U.S.'s hands. Japanese and foreigners criticize Japan's foreign policy as "a policy to follow the footsteps of the U.S." Thus, Japanese government wants to have an independent foreign policy. Japan has the capability to build up enough power to defend itself and is

strengthening the concept of a “Capability-based Defense Force.”

On July 14, the Japanese officials expressed their stance about the Japan-U.S. co-developing missile defense systems and said that Japan could export the missile defense system to third country. This expression implies that Japan and U.S. possibly intend to include Taiwan into their missile defense network. No matter what, Japan is hastening the deployment of multi-layer missile defense system and is upgrading the Japan-U.S. joint research program on missile technology from “research” to “development and deployment.”

Securing energy becomes another conflict point. Energy has become a vital resource for national growth. Those who can gain the energy will achieve economic development. The energy war is a window to see how Japan should manage the Japan-China relationships. Following the developed countries path, China is increasingly consuming energy for its industrialization. China’s ocean exploitation of gas resource in the East China Sea has become a new battlefield. As China is going to produce gas soon, tension between Japan and China has risen. China’s gas base does not go over a boundary line, but Japan accuses that Japan and China’s gas resources are linked together and liquid, so they will drift from Japanese side to China’s side. China is using a straw to suck Japanese gas in Japanese side. Finally, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry announced that Japanese government admitted a prospecting right of a gas field of East China Sea to Teikoku Oil on July 14, 2005. This admission will escalate the tension of energy wars.

Because the Japan-U.S. alliance is running smoothly these days, some articles argue that Japan and U.S. will support each other’s foreign policy. If their national interests are compatible, the answer is “yes.” But when the national interests are not compatible, the answer is “no.” For example, Japan intends to be a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. The U.S.

seemed to always support Japan. On July 12, U.S. surprisingly expressed objection and called other countries to cast an opposite vote. Japan was shocked by this announcement. There is a feeling of caution to vested rights being lost by permanent member expansion in an existing permanent member. U.S. and China's national interests are compatible, so they stand on the same side this time. A national interest is complicated, but the United Nations is the place where national interest conflicts with national interest originally (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 14, 2005).

Finally, the dispatch issue of the SDF is testing the future of Japan-U.S. alliance. Iraqi peace and order situation is still unstable. Criticism to Bush Administration rises. According to the public opinion poll, the ratio that does not support an Iraqi policy of the Bush Administration exceeds support percentage. This percentage has started to change from 2004. The American is weakening an emotional action for 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, the American forces still do not have the clear time-card to withdraw from Iraq. Rather they cannot withdraw. It is predicted that Iraqi domestic instability will turn worse remarkably if American forces withdraw. Therefore the Bush Administration falls into the dilemma of between a surge of criticism to an Iraqi policy and confusion of Iraqi domestic situation.

Because Japan is an American important partner, it is very likely that dispatch time limit extension of the SDF is demanded. The high politics judgment is pressing the Koizumi Administration. According to the Japanese viewpoint, the SDF is doing the humanitarian support in Iraq, but, actually, there is a dual structure. In other words the SDF does logistical support of the U.S. forces at the same time. Now Japan argues whether it can hand over a role of SDF charges to private enterprise. For example, it is an organization such as ODA. In other words it is the outsourcing of a role of the armed forces.

For example, there are a clean water function and restoration of a road. After all, the Japan side thinks that the best about the nation rebuilding is to be done by Iraqi hands. Japan teaches the Iraqi people the know-how. But it is reality that the environment is not set for private enterprise to go, because a problem of the peace and order cannot be yet settled in the current situation. Besides, the SDF is an indispensable symbol for Iraqi policy of the Bush Administration, which is not replaceable by any private enterprise. On December 8, 2005, Japanese government has decided to extend the dispatch of SDF for one more year.

Consequently, Japan and China are not inevitable foes. Japan insists to “develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.”² President Hu Jintao insists “as long as we firmly follow the path of development, we will be able to play a greater and more constructive role in the promotion of world peace and common development.” “China and the rest of Asia and the world at large are closely related when it comes to development” (Hu, 2005). Besides, U.S. has multidirectional outlook on to Japan and China. The growing Chinese market is attracting U.S. to keep play a balancing role. The U.S. loves one of them more in the economic field. Thus, Japan Godzilla and China dragon can co-evolve. Japan is U.S.’s best partner in the East Asia, but U.S. is not always Japan’s supporter or China’s opponent. Each country thinks of nothing but its own national interests. The win-win results are high expectations.

² See “Joint Statement of U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005, <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/joint/20050219.htm>.

Conclusions

This paper has proved that the rising Godzilla is looking for ways to cope with the rising dragon. Japan's rise vs. China's rise has become the main framework to affect the East Asian stability and development. There are global standard and regional standard to clarify Japan-China relationships. The prosperity and peace of Japan is dependent upon its relationships with China and other East Asian countries. Because each country is making policy for its own national interests, so "compatibility" is the most powerful glue to arrange a suitable alliance relationship. If someone's rise is compatible with other's interests, this rise will be defined as an opportunity. Otherwise, it will be defined as a threat. The role of friend and/or foe is changing. One country could be another one's friend and foe simultaneously. Sometimes a foe's activities could help you. We cannot use a single aspect of cooperation or competition to decode the standard competition. *Co-opetition*, combined with cooperation and competition, is the correct approach. Cooperation has priority over competition. Now Japan struggles to define China, even U.S. as friend, foe or something between. U.S. is not always Japan's friend. China's is not doomed to be U.S. or Japan's foe. The determinant depends on which issues and development stages. However, peace and prosperity are the common interests for each combination.

If the East Asian standard is not compatible with U.S.-led global standard, it will face high pressure from the U.S. Because the concept of an East Asian Community does not include the U.S., Japan also intends to bridge between the U.S. global strategy and the East Asian integration. Meanwhile, the Japan-U.S. alliance is still the most important pillar to maintain Japan's peace and security,

but the unilateral following era is over. Japan is exploring the future model of Japan-U.S. alliance. Although the future is unpredictable, we know that Japan wants to rectify “a policy to follow the footsteps of the U.S.” to an independent foreign policy and bring its will to the U.S. nowadays.

It is well known that China is the new powerful force in the 21st century. The waked dragon is causing Godzilla’s anxiety and challenging Japan for the regional hegemonic powers. If the dragon can clearly describe where it is going to, which can ease the Godzilla’s anxiety. It is still early to tell whether Japan or China will win the championship of East Asian leadership. Instead of Japan’s standard or China’s one, this regional standard could be the mixture of Japan and China’s compatible advantages.

Japan and China are pursuing hard-line diplomacy to against each other recently. The history of Japan-China relations is full of tributary, war, and hatred. The rising nationalism wakes up the idle Godzilla and dragon. The dragon is not doomed and should be not the foe for Godzilla final wars. Human has learned the wisdom from history to control them. Private companies are the catalysts.

Japan’s future and that of China are linked. Their respective economies are deeply interdependent, which could help to manage political and military conflicts. What Japan and China are making in their minds is more than a foreign policy. It is an East Asia future. The stable Japan-China relationships are not only for East Asian happiness today, but also for their success tomorrow. Even in the best of circumstances, many East Asian countries are inherently weak. That is why the two East Asia giants must take the leadership to recognize and protect them. The size of the cooperative opportunity between Japan and China is immeasurable.

Finally, anti-Japan, de-U.S., and pro-China seem to become a new tide of

East Asia. Japan's East Asian strategies and the Japan-U.S. alliance must be mutually compatible. Fighting with China dragon is not and should not be Japan Godzilla's final war, and vice versa. Both final wars in the 21st century are to build a stable and prosperous East Asian regional order of no-war community. Unfortunately, the Japan-China relationships are shifting from "politics cold and economies hot" to "politics cold and economies cool."

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日本崛起 vs. 中國崛起

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摘要

在人類的歷史裡沒有永遠的強權，復權中的東洋對抗西洋之模式似乎再度浮現。中國在崛起，日本也在旭日東昇，這是史上第一次兩個國家同時處於強盛狀態。日本是戰後的東亞的大國，中國這條龍經過數百年的沉睡之後終於醒過來，變成二十一世紀的明日之星。穩定的日中關係決定東亞地區國家的現在和未來。日中雙方共享經濟互補關係，但是政治和軍事關係卻是相當冷淡，因此日中關係被形容為「政冷經熱」。

中國軍事威脅論的升溫、日中關係的惡化、共同利益糾葛和區域糾紛使得日美同盟關係越來越緊密，日本變成美國在東亞的代言人。例如首屆東亞高峰會裡，美國並未正式受邀參與，日本積極地扮演代言角色，一再強調美國參與的重要性，企圖拉攏美國來制衡中國的主導力量。

日本和中國的未來是緊密地連結在一起，雙方領導人應有智慧創造雙贏結果。可惜事實上，中國對雙方關係的前景抱持悲觀，日本的對中強硬派也逐漸抬頭，且被視為最有可能的小泉首相繼承人安倍晉三官房長官也是強硬派。所以日中關係想要在後小泉時代開創新局並不容易。況且最近的日中關係已漸漸從「政冷經熱」轉為「政冷經涼」。

關鍵字：酷斯拉、龍、同盟、標準、相容